In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the`probabilistic predictions of quantum theory' from the`non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory' and the`nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.' We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non-probabilistic axioms is already su¯cient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Deutsch (1999) attempts to derive the`probabilistic predictions of quantum theory' from the`non-probabilistic part of quantum theory' and what he views as the`non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory.' For Deutsch this means the following. The non-probabilistic part of quantum theory is contained in the axioms that associate quantum states with rays in Hilbert space and observables with Hermitian operators; in particular, the eigenvalues of a Hermitian operator are the only possible results of a measurement of the corresponding observable, and if the quantum state is an eigenstate of the Hermitian operator, the eigenvalue is the certain result of a measurement of that observable. The relevant non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory includes the assumption that a rational decision maker orders all his preferences transitively|that is, if he prefers A to B and B to C, he must also prefer A to C. From these assumptions, Deutsch seeks to derive, rst, that quantum mechanics has a probabilistic interpretation and, second, that the quantum probability rule has the standard form of a squared inner product (Everett 1957) .y Deutsch describes his result as follows:
Thus we see that quantum theory permits what philosophy would hitherto have regarded as a formal impossibility, akin to`deriving an ought from an is', namely deriving a probability statement from a factual statement. This could be called deriving a`tends to' from a`does'.
In this paper we examine both aspects of Deutsch's argument. First, as we discuss in x 2, the standard non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, which include the assumption of (complete) transitive preferences, already ensure that the preferences can be ordered in terms of probabilities and utility functions (Savage 1972; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947 ).z It is therefore possible to derive probability statements from factual statements about preferences without invoking quantum theory. Second, as we detail in x 3, Deutsch's derivation of the form of the quantum probability law fails because an ambiguity in his notation masks a hidden assumption that is essential for the derivation.
Despite the failure of Deutsch's derivation, we are sympathetic to the view that the meaning of probability in quantum mechanics is speci ed by its role in rational decision making. Indeed, we believe that this view can help illuminate the very nature of quantum theory (Caves et al. 2000) . We believe, however, that the primary technical machinery underlying this view is already provided by Gleason's theorem (Gleason 1957) , an oft-neglected derivation of the quantum probability law. We review the theorem in x 4. Gleason assumes that observables are described by Hermitian operators, supplementing that only by the assumption that the results of measurements cannot always be predicted with certainty and that the uncertainty is described by probabilities that are consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of the observables. From this he is able to derive both that the possible states are density operators and that the quantum probability law is the standard one. Because Gleason's theorem gives both the state space of quantum mechanics and the probability rule, we believe it trumps all other derivations along these lines.
Probabilities and decision theory
Classical decision theory, formulated along the lines that Deutsch has in mind, envisions a rational decision maker, or agent, who is confronted with a choice among various games (Savage 1972; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947 ). Each game is described by a set of events labelled by an index j, which the agent believes will occur with probability p j . The value the agent attaches to an event within a given game is quanti ed by its utility x j . Decision theory seeks to capture the notion of y There have been many precursors to Deutsch's attempt to derive the quantum probability rule within a deterministic (many-worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics. The seminal paper, contemporaneous with the proof of Gleason's theorem, is that of Everett (1957) . A summary of criticisms of these derivations can be found in Kent (1990) .
z Classical decision theory does not assume classical physics or even a classical (realistic) world view. Indeed, for the purposes of decision theory, it is immaterial whether the uncertainty about the measurement outcomes can be removed in principle, as in a deterministic theory, or not, as in an indeterministic theory. All that matters is that the rational decision maker is uncertain about the outcomes. The probabilities introduced in this way need not be properties of a physical system; rather they are quantities that, together with the utility function, capture the rational agent's preferences. rational decision making by positing that the agent decides among the games by choosing the one that has the largest expected utility, X j p j x j : (2.1)
A simple consequence of this framework is that an agent can give his preferences among games a complete transitive ordering. Deutsch extracts what he sees as the non-probabilistic part of decision theory and applies it to quantum mechanics in the following way. A game is again described by events, now interpreted as the outcomes of a measurement of a Hermitian operator that has eigenstates j¿ j i. The jth outcome has utility x j . In place of the probabilities of classical decision theory, Deutsch substitutes the normalized quantum state of the system in question,
Thus a quantum game, in Deutsch's formulation, is characterized by a quantum state and utilities that depend on the outcome of a measurement performed on that state.
As the nal part of his formulation, Deutsch de nes the value of a game|the central notion in his argument|as`the utility of a hypothetical pay-o¬ such that the player is indi¬erent between playing the game and receiving that pay-o¬ unconditionally.' Deutsch does not assume that the value of a game is an expected utility, for that is precisely the probabilistic aspect of classical decision theory he wants to exclude from his formulation. He does assume that the values are transitively ordered and that a rational decision maker decides among games by choosing the game with the largest value. Deutsch describes this in the following way:
On being o¬ered the opportunity to play such a game at a given price, knowing jÁi, our player will respond somehow: he will either accept or refuse. His acceptance or refusal will follow a strategy which, given that he is rational, must be expressible in terms of transitive preferences and therefore in terms of a value V [jÁi] for each possible game.
Notice that Deutsch denotes the value of a game without explicit reference to the utilities and the corresponding eigenstates, which partly de ne the game. We prefer a more explicit notation. First we de ne a Hermitian utility operator
We now can denote the value of a game more explicitly as V (jÁi;X), which includes both de ning features of a game, the quantum state jÁi and the utility operatorX . Our notation serves its purpose in x 3, where it helps to ferret out a ®aw in Deutsch's derivation.
Before turning to such details of Deutsch's argument, we consider a more fundamental issue. Deutsch's claim that it is quantum theory that`permits : : : deriving a probability statement from a factual statement' is misleading, because his assumption of complete transitive preferences is tantamount to assuming probabilities at the outset. The conventional understanding of preferences|making decisions in the face of uncertainty|already hints strongly that probabilities will be an essential tool in any decision theory. Indeed, this is the import of a fundamental result of the theory (Savage 1972; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947; Bernardo & Smith 1994) : if one assumes complete transitive preferences among games along with standard nonprobabilistic axioms, one can determine simultaneously utility functions and sets of probabilities, such that the agent's behaviour is described as maximizing expected utility. If the preferences among games are quanti ed by a value function V , then for each game there exist probabilities p j and transformed utilities F (x j ), where F is a strictly increasing function, such that expected utility gives the same ordering:
Chapters 2 and 3 of the book by Savage (1972) contain a complete exposition of this theory, including a precise statement of the axioms and a derivation of the fundamental result. For a modern version of the theory with a somewhat di¬erent emphasis, the reader is referred to ch. 2 of Bernardo & Smith (1994) . The crucial point is that the intimate relationship between preferences and probabilities expressed in equation (2.4) is of a purely classical decision-theoretic origin, having nothing to do with quantum mechanics. Thus Deutsch's argument fails to exclude a priori probabilistic considerations. Nevertheless, the argument might provide a derivation of the speci c form of the quantum probability law. To assess this possibility, we turn now to Deutsch's speci c argument.
Examination of Deutsch's derivation
In this section we examine the derivation of what Deutsch terms the`pivotal result' of his argument,
that is, that the value of a game in which the quantum state is an equal linear combination of two eigenstates of the utility operator is the arithmetic mean of the utilities. The derivation of the pivotal result is contained in Deutsch's eqns (D7){ (D11) and related textual material. (Here and throughout we refer to equations in Deutsch's paper by pre xing a`D' to the equation number.) We comment brie®y on later steps in Deutsch's argument at the end of this section. Deutsch uses a notation for the value of a game that makes no explicit reference to the utility operator. Furthermore, he employs a notational convention, often used in physics, whereby an eigenvector of an operator|in this case the utility operator| is labelled by its eigenvalue|in this case the utility itself. This labelling can cause confusion when games involving di¬erent utility operators are under consideration, as in the argument examined in this section. The resulting ambiguity leads Deutsch to accidentally equate the value of two games whose value cannot be shown to be equal without some additional assumption. Identifying this hidden assumption is the goal of this section.
In deriving the pivotal result, Deutsch posits two properties of the quantum value function. The rst, given in eqn (D8), we call the displacement property. Written in our notation, this property becomes
Our notation makes clear that both sides of this equation refer to the same quantum state, but di¬erent utility operators. In contrast, eqn (D8) is ambiguous. The left-hand side of eqn (D8) refers to the state P j ¶ j jx j + ki, whereas the right-hand side refers to the state P j ¶ j jx j i; it is unclear whether the two sides refer to different quantum states or to a single state labelled according to two di¬erent utility operators. We adopt the latter interpretation as being the one most consistent with Deutsch's discussion. The second property of value functions, Deutsch's zero-sum property (D9), becomes in our notation,
Equation (D9) su¬ers from the same sort of ambiguity as eqn (D8): it refers to two states, P j ¶ j j¡ x j i and
3) we again choose the interpretation that there is a single state, but two di¬erent utility operators. The zero-sum property is an axiom of Deutsch's non-probabilistic decision theory, and the displacement property follows from the principle of additivity, another axiom of his analysis.
The derivation of the pivotal result deals with a state jÁi that is a superposition of two utility eigenstates:
When writing the displacement and zero-sum properties for such a state, we can omit the other eigenstates from the utility operator, since as Deutsch shows, the corresponding outcomes do not occur. To shorten the equations, we introduce the abbreviations¦ i = j¿ i ih¿ i j; i = 1; 2: (3.5)
We now proceed in our notation through the rest of the argument leading to eqn (D11). We carry along arbitrary amplitudes ¶ 1 and ¶ 2 , because this helps to illustrate the nature of the hidden assumption. The reasoning begins with the displacement property (D8), specialized to the case k = ¡ x 1 ¡ x 2 :
Applying the zero-sum property (3.3) to the game on the right-hand side yields
Deutsch uses this result in the case ¶ 1 = ¶ 2 = 1= p 2, where it becomes
In Deutsch's notation the values of the two games in this equation are denoted in the same way, so he assumes they are equal,
which leads immediately to the pivotal result (3.1). Equation (3.9) is the hidden assumption in Deutsch's argument. To see that it is required, consider the following rule for measurement outcomes: the result associated with eigenstate j¿ 1 i always occurs. This deterministic rule is perfectly legitimate at this point in the argument. In equation (3.8) it gives utility x 2 in the rst game and utility x 1 in the second, thus satisfying the equation.
Another way to get at the import of Deutsch's hidden assumption is to make a similar assumption for the case of arbitrary expansion coe¯cients, that is to assume
(3.10)
Both this assumption and the more specialized one embodied in equation (3.9) are equally well (or badly) justi ed at this stage of the argument. The reason is that as yet ¶ 1 and ¶ 2 are just numbers attached to the possible outcomes, having no a priori relation to probabilities. Substituting equation (3.10) into equation (3.7) gives
which generalizes to the rule that the value of a game is the arithmetic mean of the utilities that have non-zero amplitude. This corresponds to the probability rule p j = (number of non-zero amplitudes) ¡1 . Notice that this probability rule is contextual in the sense of Gleason's theorem (see discussion in x 4).
We conclude that to derive the pivotal result (3.1), one must include equation (3.9) as an additional assumption. In our view, including this additional assumption is not just a minor addition to Deutsch's list of assumptions, but rather a major conceptual shift. The assumption is akin to applying Laplace's Principle of Insu¯cient Reason to a set of indistinguishable alternatives, an application that requires acknowledging a priori that amplitudes are related to probabilities. Once this acknowledgment is made, however, the pivotal result (3.1) is a simple consequence of classical decision theory, as can be seen in the following way. As discussed in x 2, the existence of a numerical value V (jÁi;X) for each game, together with standard non-probabilistic axioms of decision theory, entails that there exist probabilities p 1 and p 2 such that
where F is a strictly increasing function. The hidden assumption (3.9) then takes the form
If this is to be true for arbitrary x 1 and x 2 (or for any x 1 6 = x 2 ), it follows that p 1 = p 2 = 1=2. Thus in the context of classical decision theory, the assumption (3.9) is equivalent to applying the Principle of Insu¯cient Reason to the case of equal amplitudes.
It is di¯cult to assess the validity of Deutsch's argument once one gets past the derivation of the pivotal result. This is mainly because the remainder of the argument repeatedly invokes the principle of substitutability. The di¯culty is that this principle|that the value of a game is unchanged when a subgame is replaced by another subgame of equal value|is never given a precise mathematical formulation in the quantum context. In any case, the remainder of the argument can be simpli ed once one realizes that the Principle of Insu¯cient Reason is an essential ingredient, for then one gets immediately that for an equal superposition of n eigenstates, the probability of each outcome is 1=n.
The vagueness of the principle of substitutability has an important consequence. We believe that the probability rule following equation (3.11) satis es all of Deutsch's assumptions, including a suitably de ned principle of substitutability. If it does, then it shows that no amount of cleverness in using Deutsch's assumptions can ever lead uniquely to the standard quantum rule for probabilities. The ®y in the ointment is that without a precise formulation of the principle of substitutability, it is not possible to tell whether this rule satis es it.
Conclusion
We have seen that if one assumes the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory, then one is e¬ectively introducing probabilities at the same time. Indeed, once one realizes that quantum theory deals with uncertain outcomes, one is forced to introduce probabilities as they provide the only language for quantifying uncertainty (Savage 1972; Caves et al. 2000; De Finetti 1972; Cox 1946) . (Also see the second footnote on p. 1176.) From this point of view, the most powerful and compelling derivation of the quantum probability rule is Gleason's theorem.
Gleason's theorem (Gleason 1957; Cooke 1981; Pitowsky 1998) . Assume there is a function f from the one-dimensional projectors acting on a Hilbert space of dimension greater than 2 to the unit interval, with the property that for each orthonormal basis fjÁ k ig, X k f (jÁ k ihÁ k j) = 1: (4.1)
Then there exists a density operator» such that f (jÁihÁj) = hÁj» jÁi: (4.2)
It is worthwhile to ponder the meaning of this theorem. It assumes the Hilbertspace structure of observables|that is, that each orthonormal basis corresponds to the mutually exclusive results of a measurement of some observable. It sets as its task to derive the probabilities for the inevitably uncertain measurement outcomes. The only further ingredient required is that the probability for obtaining the result corresponding to a normalized vector jÁi depends only on jÁi itself, not on the other vectors in the orthonormal basis de ning a particular measurement. This important assumption, which might be called the`non-contextuality' of the probabilities, means that the probabilities are consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of the observables. With these assumptions the probabilities for all measurements can be derived from a density operator» using the standard quantum probability rule. Remarkably, this conclusion does not rely on any assumption about the continuity or di¬erentia-bility of f ; the only essential property of f is that it be bounded.
By assuming that measurements are described by probabilities that are consistent with the Hilbert-space structure of the observables, Gleason's theorem derives in one shot the state-space structure of quantum mechanics and the probability rule. It is hard to imagine a cleaner derivation of the probability rule than this.
